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SPLITTING A CAUSE OF ACTION WHEN SUBROGATION
IS INVOLVED
When a wrongful or negligent act causes both property damage
and personal injury, does it give rise to a single cause of action or
two separate actions for invasion of a property right and injury to
the person? The majority of states hold that there is but a single
cause of action with two elements of damage, both recoverable only
in a single suit.' This view, to which Florida adheres, 2 seems
preferable, since it eliminates harassment of a defendant 3 and multiplicity of suits.4
Although the single-suit rule normally produces just results, subrogation may introduce a serious problem. When an insured suffers
both personal injury and property damage, his property loss is paid
by the insurer, who thereby acquires a claim against the tort-feasor.
If the insured's claim for personal injury is not joined with the
insurer's property damage claim, will the first judgment bar the
other claimant from recovery? In practically every situation the insurer is protected by a clause in the insurance contract relieving it
of liability and permitting recovery from the insured if the right of
subrogation is prejudiced.5 If the insured sues for personal injury
and property damage, the insured holds the property damage recovery
in trust for the insurer.6 But the insured seems to have no such protection against prejudice to his personal injury claim when the insurer has recovered a judgment in a prior separate action for property
damage.
EXCEPTIONS TO THE SINGLE-SUIT RULE

Justificationfor Two Actions
A number of jurisdictions have held that when subrogation is
involved, recovery of a judgment by either the insurer or the insured is not a bar to a second suit by the holder of an unsatisfied
claim. This exception to the single-suit rule has usually been based
on one of three arguments:
1. See, e.g., Gregory v. Schnurstein, 212 Ga. 497, 93 S.E.2d 680 (1956); Dearden
v. Hey, 304 Mass. 659, 24 N.E.2d 644 (1939); Sprague v. Adams, 139 Wash. 510,
247 Pac. 960 (1926). See also Annot., 62 A.L.R.2d 982 (1958).
2. Gaynon v. Statum, 151 Fla. 793, 10 So. 2d 432 (1942).
3. Kidd v. Hillman, 14 Cal. App. 2d 507, 58 P.2d 662 (1936).
4. Levitt v. Simco Sales Serv., Inc., 50 Del. 557, 135 A.2d 910 (1957).
5. Cedarholm v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 81 Idaho 136, 338 P.2d 93 (1959);
Farmer v. Union Ins. Co., 146 Miss. 600, 111 So. 584 (1927).
6. E.g., Hayward v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 212 Minn. 500, 4 N.W.2d
316 (1942); Moultroup v. Gorham, 113 Vt. 317, 34 A.2d 96 (1943).
7. See, e.g., Travelers Indem. Co. v. Moore, 304 Ky. 456, 201 S.V.2d 7 (1947);
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(1) The insurer has an equitable interest in the automobile
by virtue of the contract of insurance and the article of subrogation, and this interest becomes a separate right of action
when the loss is paid to the insurer.8
(2) Since the property damage insurer cannot bring a
claim for personal injuries, his suit is not substantially the same
as an action by the injured insured.9
(3) Justice demands that an exception be allowed.' 0
The Tort-feasor'sKnowledge of the Insurer'sClaim
Many jurisdictions bar a suit by the insurer if the tort-feasor has
defended an action by the insured, or has obtained a release from
the insured, with no apparent knowledge of the insurer's claim."'
But if the tort-feasor was aware of the insurer's claim when the insured initiated his claim or signed a release, he waives his right to
object to a second suit by the insurer. 2 This distinction seems justified when it is considered that the rule against splitting a cause of
action is intended to eliminate harassment of the tort-feasor and is
therefore for his benefit. If he has knowledge of the subrogation
agreement and fails to make a timely objection when the insured
sues, he should not be permitted to complain later. If he should
settle with the insured and obtain a release with knowledge of the
insurer's claim, his actions would seem to border on fraud.
In the event that actions by both the insurer and the insured are
Underwriters at Lloyd's Ins. Co. v. Vicksburg Traction Co., 106 Miss. 244, 63 So.
455 (1913); Underwood v. Dooley, 197 N.C. 100, 147 S.E. 686 (1929); Vasu v.
Kohlers, Inc., 145 Ohio St. 321, 61 N.E.2d 707 (1945).
8. Underwriters at Lloyd's Ins. Co. v. Vicksburg Traction., 106 Miss. 244, 251,
63 So. 455, 456 (1913).
9. Underwood v. Dooley, 197 N.C. 100, 147 S.E. 686 (1929).
10. Farmer v. Union Ins. Co., 146 Miss. 600, 111 So. 584 (1927).
11. E.g., Calvert Fire Ins. Co. v. Maddox, 38 Ala. App. 194, 82 So. 2d 277
(1955); Universal Credit Co. v. Service Fire Ins. Co., 69 Ga. App. 357, 25 S.E.2d
526 (1943); Farmer v. Union Ins. Co., supra note 10; Gulf Ins. Co. v. White, 242
S.W.2d 663 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951). But cf. Fidelity & Guar. Fire Corp. v. Silver
Fleet Motor Express, Inc., 242 Ala. 559, 7 So. 2d 290 (1942) (exception for subrogation allowed); Hanover Fire Ins. Co. v. Elrod, 91 Ga. App. 403, 85 S.E.2d 821
(1955) (receipt from tort-feasor did not prejudice insurer's claim); Underwriters
at Lloyd's Ins. Co. v. Vicksburg Traction Co., supra note 8 (exception allowed);
Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Continental Bus System, Inc., 274 S.W.2d 175 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1954) (insurer's release did not bar second action when tort-feasor had
notice of insurer's claim).
12. Bahn v. Shaley, 125 A.2d 678 (Munic. Ct. App. D.C. 1956); General Exch.
Ins. Corp. v. Young, 357 Mo. 1099, 212 S.W.2d 396 (1948) (insured gave release
for property damage but insurer was not barred, since tort-feasor had knowledge
of insurer's claim); Underwood v. Dooley, supra note 9; Calvert Fire Ins. Co. v.
James, 236 S.C. 431, 114 S.E.2d 832 (1960).
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pending simultaneously, it has been held that unless the tort-feasor
makes a timely objection, judgment for one plaintiff will not bar a
13
later action by the other.
FLORIDA'S POSITION

Florida courts have decided two cases on the single-suit rule involving subrogation. The first was a 1957 Supreme Court decision,
and the second was a 1960 Third District Court of Appeal decision.
Mims v. Reid 4 was a suit for the use and benefit of Mims' automobile insurer to recover property damages. Mims, in a prior separate suit, had dismissed his claim for property damages with Reid's
consent. The case was then settled, and judgment for personal injuries was rendered and satisfied after the insurer's claim was filed.
The Supreme Court acknowledged that other jurisdictions have
held that an insured may be permitted to recover for personal injury irrespective of a prior suit for property damages by the subrogated insurer, and that the subrogated insurer may maintain a claim
for property damages despite prior institution of an action by the
insured for personal injury. However, the Court did not follow these
cases, holding instead that a tort to person and property constitutes
a single cause of action and must be presented as a single suit. This,
said the Court, "will create greater stability in the law . . . [and]
avoid vexatious and multiple litigation ...
."15 Although this

decision seems to discard any theories of waiver or dual causes of
action as exceptions to the single-suit rule, it is interesting to note
that the Mims case may well be distinguishable from one in which
the insured has sued only for personal injury and has not brought and
dismissed a claim for property damages.
In Scott v. Rosenthal,1y a Third District Court of Appeal case,
the insured commenced an action for personal injuries. The insurer
had already paid the insured's property damage claim and had
brought suit in its own name against Rosenthal for property damage.
While the insured's suit was pending the insurance company settled
its claim against Rosenthal, and its suit for property damages was
dismissed with prejudice. Rosenthal thereupon filed an answer to
Scott's complaint, setting up the dismissal as a defense, and obtained
13. Georgia Ry. & Power Co. v. Endsley, 167 Ga. 439, 145 S.E. 851 (1928);
Todd v. Central Petroleum Co., 155 Kan. 249, 124 P.2d 704 (1942); RESTATEMENT,
JUDGMENTS §62 (c), comment m (1942). But see Vane v. C. Hoffberger Co., 196
Md. 450, 77 A.2d 152 (1950), in which the first suit resulted in a judgment before
the defendant was required to file his answer to the second complaint, and the
second suit was barred.
14. 98 So. 2d 498 (Fla. 1957).

15.

Id. at 501.

16.

118 So. 2d 555 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1960).
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a summary judgment. In reversing the trial court the district court
distinguished the Mims decision because in that case there had been
a stipulation at pretrial conference for the dismissal of a claim for
property damages with the defendant's consent and without his
knowledge of the insurer's claim. The court further asserted that in
Mims the Supreme Court had recognized the existence of an exception to the single-cause rule but had not found it material to the
case. Acknowledging the validity of the single-cause rule, the court
held that a defendant waives his rights against a split cause of action
if he does not object before the first judgment is rendered. Going
further, the court declared that another exception to the single-suit
rule is recognized when subrogation is involved.
Thus the Third District Court of Appeal expressly adopted both
the waiver and the subrogation exceptions to the rule against splitting
a single cause of action and held that an insured does not lose his
cause of action for personal injury by accepting payment for property damages from an insurer that thereafter recovers on its subrogated claim.
CONCLUSION

It can well be argued that the Supreme Court, by its decision in
Mims, foreclosed application of any exceptions to the rule against
splitting a cause of action, notwithstanding the seemingly contrary
position of the Third District Court of Appeal in Scott. However, one
cannot escape the striking factual differences between Mims and Scott.
In the former, the insurer was denied his property damage claim
against the tort-feasor when the insured had obtained a judgment for
personal injury and had dismissed his claim for property damages,
possibly without the tort-feasor's knowledge of the insurer's claim.
In Scott the insured was allowed his cause of action for personal injury after the insurer, having acquired the insured's property damage claim by subrogation, had settled with the tort-feasor. Also, in
Scott the tort-feasor had knowledge of the separate suits but made no
timely motion for joinder, thereby waiving any objection to a splitting of the personal injury and property damage claims. In Mires the
insurance contract in all probability released the insurer from liability
under the policy when its claim was prejudiced, but in Scott the
insured's claim for personal injury could not have been so protected.
Had the court refused to make an exception to the single-cause rule
the insured would have been denied his rightful claim for personal
injury damages. If faced with facts that justify application of an
exception to the single-unit rule, it seems probable that the Supreme
Court may limit the broad sweep of its language in Mims to the
factual situation of that case.
JAMES L. RITCHEY
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